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Book Review
TRIBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: STATES, TRIBES, AND THE 
GOVERNANCE OF MEMBERSHIP, by Kirsty Gover 1
EMILY SNYDER 2
CITIZENSHIP IS DEEPLY ENTWINED with state and Indigenous law. Th e 
conceptualization and governance of belonging to, and participating within, 
collectives have far-reaching social, political, legal, and thus also profoundly 
personal implications. The legal dimensions of Indigenous citizenship are 
particularly complex, as both Indigenous and state law are at play.3 In her book, 
Tribal Constitutionalism: States, Tribes, and the  Governance of Membership, Kirsty 
Gover raises important questions about the discrepancies between Indigenous and 
settler-state approaches to articulating and governing Indigenous citizenship. 
While I focus on Canada in this review, Gover’s research includes Canada, the 
United States, New Zealand, and Australia. It addresses the question of “what 
principles should structure the relationship between settler and tribal governments 
in membership governance?”4 Gover looks at various historical and contemporary 
1. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) 276 pages.
2. Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Sociology, University of Alberta.
3. I use the word “Indigenous” to describe those who self-identify as Indigenous persons. I use 
“Indigenous law” to describe Indigenous peoples’ legal traditions and practices that have 
historically existed and continue to exist, and are drawn on by Indigenous peoples today. I 
refer to state law’s treatment of Indigenous issues as “state law” only. When the term “tribal 
law” appears in this review, it is used to describe what the author of Tribal Constitutionalism 
is saying, as this is part of the language that she uses in her work. Further, I understand 
“citizenship” and “membership” to be related, yet distinct, terms. I use “membership” only 
when referring specifi cally to the membership codes and/or Gover’s arguments (as she uses 
the language of membership), and I use “citizenship” to speak to broader participatory 
engagement with one another. See Tully on “diverse citizenship”: James Tully, Public 
Philosophy in a New Key: Volume II: Imperialism and Civic Freedom (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008) at 267-300.   
4. Supra note 1 at 2. 
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state approaches to governing who ‘counts’ as Indigenous. Her primary objective 
is to provide an analysis that is attentive to “the role played by Indigenous 
communities in the construction of indigeneity.”5 She does this through a focus 
on Indigenous peoples’ membership codes and constitutions as articulations of 
citizenship on their own terms.
By means of an impressive examination of 737 membership codes and tribal 
constitutions, Gover makes a unique contribution to the literature by providing 
a study that can speak to the broader trends and patterns in these documents.6 
She states: 
Th e study off ers traction on the following questions: what criteria do tribes use to 
self-constitute? In what ways do their prospective membership criteria diverge from 
rules assigned by the State in negotiating a tribe’s base roll? What exogenous infl uences 
shape tribal membership rules and which of these result from the actions and policies 
of settler governments? What use is made of public law concepts of indigeneity in 
tribal membership governance?7
She works to address these and other questions in four main chapters. 
In the fi rst chapter Gover situates her discussion in the prevailing debates 
about Indigenous membership. One of the primary concerns to which she 
draws attention is the disjuncture between settler-state and tribal approaches to 
defi ning Indigenous membership. She highlights the fact that some people who 
are recognized by the state as Indigenous may not be recognized as such by tribes 
(or “bands,” to make the language more specifi c to Canada), and vice versa. Th is 
disjuncture can result in a large number of exclusions and in signifi cant tension 
amongst Indigenous peoples, as well as between them and the state. Gover grounds 
this discussion in a theoretical deliberation on cultural pluralism, which I discuss 
further below. Chapter one also includes a summary of the main fi ndings from her 
research, including a focus on descent, residency requirements, the concept of 
indigeneity, and issues around enrolment and disenrolment. 
Chapter two includes a more detailed comparison of the constitutions and 
codes themselves. Th e author begins by discussing her methodological approach 
and speaking to the challenges concerning the lack of public availability of these 
documents. Most of these documents are not easily accessible to the public 
5. Ibid at 10. 
6. Ibid at 6.
7. Ibid at 2-3. Gover further explains, “I suggest that this lack of information has led to a bias in 
the political theory of indigenous peoples, towards an ascriptive model of tribalism that does 
not adequately account for the ways tribes self-constitute in the day-to-day exercise of tribal 
constitutionalism.” See ibid at 67. 
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and Gover considers the possible implications of this, including a concern that 
theorists as well as policy-makers are coming to conclusions and making ill-
informed decisions about membership. She then describes in further detail how 
descent, multiple membership rules, and loss of membership are dealt with by 
various codes and constitutions, as well as by the states in question.  
In chapter three, the author focuses on state-Indigenous relations in 
the United States by discussing the use of blood as a quantifiable marker of 
Indianness. Gover explores how and why tribes in the United States increasingly 
use blood quantum in their membership criteria, while government use of this 
marker is decreasing.8 She also examines the growing tribal preference for “tribal 
blood” (an attempt to limit membership to specifi c tribes) as opposed to “Indian 
blood” (a pan-Indian conceptualization).9 
The discussion in chapter four is similarly focused, but the author shifts 
her attention to how land-claim settlement processes shape the development 
of Indigenous constitutions in Australia and New Zealand. Here, Gover also 
considers the complexities that the categories of “membership” versus “benefi ciaries” 
create for Indigenous articulations of citizenship.10 
Th e author works hard to confront common assumptions about Indigenous 
membership practices. She challenges readers to recognize that not all Indigenous 
communities conceive of membership in the same way and that there are a multitude 
of internal and external considerations to account for with regard to membership 
codes and constitutions. Gover attempts to show that these variations are time 
and place specifi c and that membership practices can change over time. Further, 
she calls into question the assumption that formally written rules and their 
institutionalization are incompatible with indigenous laws.11 Although I have 
an appreciation of Gover’s work, I also have some concerns, which are primarily 
methodological and analytical. 
Gover’s book is a survey. She explicitly notes that “[s]cholarship on tribal 
membership has tended to focus on particular disputes or types of dispute 
(usually disenrolments), rather than surveys,” and therefore there is a need for 
survey work on membership.12 Her book undoubtedly has useful factual 
information in it and succeeds in describing broader patterns and trends concerning 
Indigenous membership. Yet, I struggled as a reader to fully understand the signifi cance 
8. Ibid at 112.
9. Ibid at 131-32. 
10. Ibid at 157.
11. Ibid at 161-67. 
12. Ibid at 67. 
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of all of her fi ndings because the information was often too broad and, at times, 
under analyzed. Further, her broad approach creates some confusion with regard 
to language. Due to her attempt to be consistent throughout the piece, Gover 
frequently uses language that does not fi t well in particular discussions. While at 
times using terminology specifi c to the context, there were many instances where 
she spoke of, for example, First Nations people in Canada as “tribes.” Th is was 
distracting, even with the caveat that she provides about her language use.13 
Pursuing a comparative approach across four large states that are themselves 
diff erent and home to a multitude of indigenous peoples with varying social, 
cultural, political, and legal practices means that the researcher is going to be 
contending with a substantial volume of information and tasked with much 
contextualizing. Further, Gover’s analysis of 737 tribal constitutions and 
membership codes representing 586 indigenous groups would have inundated 
her with data.14 As a reader, I found that there was simply too much information 
to try to make sense of, especially in the fi rst two chapters. While the last two 
chapters are more focused and easier to read, it was disappointing that the author 
did not include a dedicated chapter on Canada, as she did with the other states. 
Survey work of this scale is diffi  cult to read, and this was compounded by analytic 
gaps in Gover’s work. Th at is to say, the author needed to better guide her readers 
through all of the information. 
Th ere were many times when further explanation and deeper analysis were 
required. For example, when writing about state defi nitions of indigeneity, Gover 
notes that prior to 1985 in Canada, Indian women lost their Indian status if they 
married a non-status man, but non-Indian women gained Indian status if they 
married a status Indian man via the Indian Act.15 She refl ects:
Following a series of challenges to the Act by Indian women who had lost their 
status on out-marriage, the Act was amended in 1985 by Bill C-31, to remove 
the gender-discriminatory elements of provisions conferring Indian status, abolish 
enfranchisement, restore persons who had lost Indian status as a result of those 
provisions, and to permit Bands to take over the governance of membership.16 
After stating this, the author immediately moves on to a discussion of how the 
state of New Zealand defi nes indigeneity. Yet, more attention to her statement about 
the Canadian context is needed. It can be argued that the 1985 amendments did 
13. Ibid at 7. 
14. Ibid at 6. Th e number of documents is higher than the number of tribes because for some 
tribes she had gathered multiple documents as they were revised over time. 
15. RSC 1985 c 1-5 s 14.
16. Ibid at 56. 
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not properly address the gender discrimination in the Indian Act; furthermore, 
there is evidence of resistance from some bands regarding the implementation 
of these membership changes.17 Bill C-3, which was an attempt to remove the 
gender discriminatory aspects of the Act itself, was recently passed. However, the 
changes from this Bill are still argued to be insuffi  cient.18
Gover later brings up Bill C-31 when explaining that First Nations could 
decide to opt out of Indian Act regulations on membership and develop their own 
codes. If First Nations opted out by 28 June 1987, then they would not have to ‘let 
in’ all of the new members resulting from the legal changes in Bill C-31 (which 
expanded the defi nitions of “status”).19 She remarks, “Th is suggests that many codes 
were prepared in some haste and with the primary aim of avoiding the full extent 
of the new obligations imposed by the Indian Act amendments.”20 Th is point is 
signifi cant, yet Gover does not speak further on it, nor does she direct readers to 
more specifi c analyses elsewhere. Th ere is something much deeper going on with 
regard to the regulation of membership: Both the state and some Indigenous groups 
rely on systemic gender discrimination and heteronormativity in the management of 
membership. How are norms and values with respect to gender and sexuality built 
into state and Indigenous conceptualizations of Indigenous membership and 
citizenship? Th is question is not addressed by Gover. While I recognize that she 
could not specifi cally analyze all of the laws and facts that she included, and that a 
gender analysis could have taken her work in a direction that she did not intend to 
go, the author could have explicitly acknowledged these power dynamics as they 
play out in relation to citizenship. Th ere are many instances in the book where 
17. See Sawridge Band v Canada 1996 1 FC 3; Sawbridge Band v Canada 1997 3 FC 580; 
Sawridge Band v Canada 2008 FC 322. For a discussion of Sawridge, see Val Napoleon 
“Aboriginal Discourse: Gender, Identity, and Community” in Benjamin J Richardson, 
Shin Imai & Kent McNeil, eds, Indigenous Peoples and the Law: Comparative and Critical 
Perspectives (Portland: Hart Publishing, 2009) 233 at 244.
18. See e.g. Sharon McIvor, “Indigenous Women Organizing for Change” (Panel discussion 
at Th e Symposium on Colonialism, Marginalization, and Gendered Violence: Dialogues 
for Change, delivered at Green College, University of British Columbia, 5 March 2011), 
[unpublished]; Sarah E Hamill, “McIvor v. Canada and the 2010 Amendments to the 
Indian Act: A Half-Hearted Remedy to Historical Injustice” (2011) 19 Const Forum Const 
75. While I recognize that Bill C-3 was passed after the publication of Gover’s book, other 
materials on the failings of the changes from Bill C-31 to address gender discrimination were 
available to the author. See Sharon McIvor, “Aboriginal Women’s Rights as ‘Existing Rights’” 
(1995) 15 Can Woman Stud 34. 
19. If a First Nation wanted to opt out of the Indian Act regulations on membership after this 
date, then they would most likely see an increase in membership. Supra note 1 at 91. 
20. Ibid. 
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Gover neglects to raise questions about power and processes of exclusion that 
arise under tribal law.21 
When analyses are not as deep as one would wish, it can lead to an impression that 
the work is inadequately contextualized, despite the author’s attempts to work against 
this. To provide another example, when discussing blood quantum in Canada, 
Gover provides the statistic that 13 per cent of “Section 10 First Nations” in her 
study use blood quantum as part of their membership codes.22 She argues that:
References to Indian blood quantum have never been used by the Canadian Federal 
Government, although references to Indian blood appeared in the fi rst attempt to 
defi ne Indians in the 1850 predecessor to the Indian Act and were not removed 
from the Act until 1951. Th e Canadian First Nation use of blood quantum, then, 
is a tribal innovation.23 
A statement such as this requires further discussion and consideration. Th e frequent 
lack of deep analyses throughout the book leads me to conclude that the scope of 
her study is perhaps too broad.
Because Gover’s research is based on analyzing documents, we do not know 
how these rules are actually being followed in practice, a point the author herself 
acknowledges.24 Yet it is still fair to discuss the implications of this omission. 
Of the 243 Section 10 First Nation membership codes that she looked at from 
Canada, an overwhelming number are from 1987.25 Th e reason for this older 
data could be that Gover was not able to access more recent copies of codes for 
21. Gover does speak of processes of exclusion within tribal legal practices in her work, but does 
so primarily by cautioning readers against the logic of liberal principles, which maintain 
that Indigenous peoples take up discriminatory practices in their membership governance. 
For example, the liberal logic would hold that, because race is referred to in some codes, 
Indigenous people are being racist and need to fi nd a “race blind” approach. Ibid at 63. 
While it is useful to consider that liberal principles can lead to unproductive conclusions 
about membership, this does not mean that urgent questions about power and systemic 
processes of exclusion within Indigenous communities should not be raised.
22. Ibid at 83. Gover uses the term “Section 10 First Nation” to refer to First Nations that 
opted out of the Indian Act regulations on membership and instead developed their own 
membership codes.
23. Ibid [emphasis in the original]. Whatever the origin of blood quantum is, Gover risks stating 
things in overly simplistic terms. Just because something is tribally constituted does not mean 
that it should be treated as unproblematic. In her work on membership codes, Val Napoleon 
highlights how deeply destructive and problematic many of the First Nations’ membership 
codes can be. See “Extinction by Number: Colonialism Made Easy” (2001) 16 CJLS 113 at 122.
24. Supra note 1 at 70.  
25. Ibid at 225-230. Gover also looked at a small number of constitutions that were developed 
by indigenous communities in Canada, who were entering into self-governance agreements 
with the federal government as per the 1995 Inherent Right of Self-Government Policy.
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practical reasons (it would be a signifi cant undertaking) or because she was denied 
access.26 All of this is to say that when Gover writes about membership codes 
as an expression of tribal law, she is referring to codes from almost twenty-fi ve years 
ago. She does not consider what sorts of changes may or may not have occurred 
since then, nor does she look at the actual practice of membership laws and politics 
on the ground. I still fi nd her analysis of the documents to be interesting and 
important, but it is relevant to note that the rules in these codes should not 
be confl ated with practice. Further, readers should not confl ate rules with 
law.27 In the Canadian context, those who govern their own membership codes 
only represent thirty-eight per cent of state-defi ned First Nations.28 As such, it 
is important that readers do not misinterpret Gover’s fi ndings as speaking to 
citizenship trends for all Indigenous peoples in Canada.29 
Important conceptual questions about tribal law came up while I was 
reading Gover’s book. For instance, what is the relationship between “tribal law” 
and “indigenous law?” Gover uses a variety of terms in her book to refer to law. 
Th is raises the question of how, for example, “custom,” “tribal customary law,” 
and “indigenous customary legal systems” diff er from one another conceptually. 
Th e language of “custom” predominates in much of the literature on Indigenous 
law. While custom is certainly a part of Indigenous laws and local practices, as 
John Borrows notes, customary law is just one type or source of law in indigenous 
legal practices.30 Customary law can be found in all legal systems but is often 
wrongfully used only to describe Indigenous peoples’ legal practices.31 Another 
question about Gover’s use of terms is: What are the diff erences between “tribal 
26. Section 10 First Nations only had to make fi rst renditions of codes available to the 
government in 1987. Ibid at 74.
27. Law is something much broader than rules. As John Borrows, a leading scholar on 
Indigenous law, writes, “Law includes both formal and informal elements. It pivots around 
deeply complex explicit and implicit ideas and practices related to respect, order, and 
authority. Laws arise whenever interpersonal interactions create expectations and obligations 
about proper conduct.” Canada’s Indigenous Constitution (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2010) at 7.
28. Supra note 1 at 74.
29. Th erefore, the majority of the state-recognized First Nations in Canada follow the Indian Act 
concerning membership. Further, there are Indigenous peoples and communities that fall 
outside of the Indian Act and who are not part of Gover’s research. 
30. Th e other sources include sacred law, natural law, deliberative law, and positivistic law. 
Borrows, supra note 27 at ch 2.
31. Ibid at 51. For a further discussion on customary law, see Jeremy Webber “Th e Grammar of 
Customary Law” (2009) 54 McGill LJ 579.
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law,” “self-governance,” and “self-constitution?” Th ere will be many answers to 
these questions, and these are important discussions that need to be ongoing. 
On a further conceptual note, the language of “membership” itself remains 
uninterrogated in Gover’s book. Does a distinction need to be made between 
“membership” and “citizenship?” I noted earlier that Gover situates her work 
in the beginning of the book in a theoretical discussion about cultural pluralism. 
Out of this discussion, Gover seeks an approach to Indigenous membership 
that views membership rules, which she understands as “cultural products,” as 
being fl uid over time and as something that develops out of complex processes 
of engagement.32 She notes that in Australia, the state’s apparatus for identifying 
indigenous people includes community recognition in addition to ancestry and 
self-identifi cation.33 Th e author argues that community recognition allows 
Indigenous-centered membership approaches to prevail, and that under such an 
approach the state concept of public indigeneity can be understood as being 
“created by the positive choices of indigenous individuals and groups.”34 While 
I do not have the space to discuss this proposal in detail here, I wonder about 
future dialogues that could take place on community recognition in relation to 
notions of citizenship that are based on participatory engagement rather than 
rule-based frameworks for belonging. Gover’s book encourages many questions 
and, importantly, encourages ongoing conversation about the entanglement of 
state law, Indigenous laws, and citizenship. 
32. Supra note 1 at 11.
33. Ibid at 54. 
34. Ibid at 11.
